Best Quotes from The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton with Page Numbers

The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed.

It seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice.

Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests.

The crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made.

The honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.

There is no more important question than the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature.

The vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interests can never be separated.

To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions.

The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other.

To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighborhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events.

The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflamed humors which have so often kindled into wars.

The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.

Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn will themselves recollect a variety of instances.

It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated.

Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms.

If we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe.

The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways.

By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.

An active commerce, an extensive navigation, a flourishing marine would then be the inevitable offspring of moral and physical necessity.

Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness!

The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of these rights, which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage.

A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union.

A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests can only result from a unity of government.

The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.

This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy.

The resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty.

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot.

The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice.

If the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the intervention of the State legislatures, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power.

The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of justice and of the body of the people.

It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution.

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted.

Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred.

The whole power of raising armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive.

The existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.

It will be shown that the necessity of Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution.

If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution as the standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a national system.

The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted.

The natural cure for an ill administration in a popular or representative constitution is a change of men.

It is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.

A guaranty by the national authority would be as much leveled against the usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.

The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people.

Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national wealth must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained.

A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience.

If we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system we may travel from one chimerical project to another.

...that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it is implied in the very act of delegating power.

It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective that if the principles they inculcate... could so far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of government whatever.

The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy.

...greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.

...there is a total silence upon the subject... It is remarkable that even in the two States... the mode of expression made use of is rather monitory than prohibitory.

Independent of parties in the national legislature... the State legislatures... will always be vigilant... guardians of the rights of the citizens.

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to mature them for execution.

If such suppositions can fairly be made, there ought to be at once an end of all delegated authority.

There cannot be an effect without a cause.

The means ought to be proportioned to the end.

Every power ought to be commensurate with its object.

A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care.

The power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation.

It is by far the safest course to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers.

If the proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford to a proper extent the same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments.

The wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it.

Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option.

There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation and will command the tribute due to their merit.

The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation.

Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!

The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.

Is the abuse of this power of taxation, which seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection.

The actual exercise of the power may be found both convenient and necessary; for it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised.

The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man.

Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own power coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression!

The misfortune under the latter system has been that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it.

If they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed to exercise the liberty which they assumed.

It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking.

The purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the greater, not the perfect, good.

A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited.

It is vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support.

The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure which has spared few other parts.

The most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power.

Our own experience has taught us, ... that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators.

The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.

The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.

They must be told that the ultimate authority... resides in the people alone.

The first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States.

The attention and attachment of the people... were turned anew to their own particular governments.

If, therefore... the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration.

The motives on the part of the State governments to augment their prerogatives... will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.

Ambitious encroachments of the federal government... would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause.

The existence of subordinate governments... forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.

Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession.

Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not.

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.

If men were angels, no government would be necessary.

Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.

In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.

It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?

The multiplicity of interests and sects is the best security for the rights of every class of citizen.

As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.

The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.

Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant.

The only difference discoverable between the two cases is that each representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual States, the election of a representative is left to about as many hundreds.

Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the cords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.

Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the work of the convention; and will disapprove every deviation from it.

No rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply could ever find its way into the national councils.

The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected.

In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government.

"The public liberty... will be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice."

"If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm... than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government."

"The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege... provides a ready answer to this question."

"Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation... as a cure for the diseases of faction."

"There could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time... that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members."

"The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions."

"A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective."

"Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent?"

"History informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate."

"If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy."

Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.

A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government.

A government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number.

Responsibility is of two kinds — to censure and to punishment.

The multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case.

The idea of a council to the executive...would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate.

The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately.

One man...will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected.

If the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members...would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it.

The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs.

When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion.

The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other has been fully displayed and illustrated.

It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body.

His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice.

The most to be expected from the generality of men in such a situation is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good.

What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations?

The reflecting that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution.

The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.

"The true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration."

"It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to produce a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union."

"The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation."

"Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject... will agree to the position that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable."

"The danger to his own reputation, and... to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism... could not fail to operate as a barrier."

"The necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful... silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President."

"The President shall have the power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate... which shall expire at the end of their next session."

"The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made... by the convention."

"No man can be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias."

"A government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority."

The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.

There ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction.

The errors and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United States will be uncontrollable and remediless.

The habit of being continually marshaled on the opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.

Justice through them may be administered with ease and dispatch.

By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either.

A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case.

It is not true that the Parliament of Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts.

The very men who object to the Senate as a court of impeachments... advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting the ultimate decision of all causes in the whole or in a part of the legislative body.

The only security for liberty and property is in a stable and fair judiciary.